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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-EXEMPTION OF
WOMEN FROM JURY DUTY VIOLATES CONSTITUTION. DJuren v. Mis-
soiuri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979). Petitioner was convicted of first degree
murder and assault with intent to kill in connection with an attempted
robbery of a United States Post Office in Jackson County, Missouri.'
The trial court denied both his pretrial motion to quash the jury panel
and his postconviction motion for a new trial.2 Both motions alleged
that Missouri's jury selection process systematically excluded women in
violation of petitioner's sixth amendment right to a fair trial.' Mis-
souri's constitutional jury duty provision4 and implementing statute 5
allowed women to decline jury service solely on the basis of their gen-
der. Aside from women, Missouri law also exempts doctors and nurses,
lawyers, clergymen, school teachers, persons over sixty-five, and gov-
ernment workers from jury duty.6 The Missouri Supreme Court on ap-
peal upheld petitioner's conviction against the sixth amendment
challenge.7 On certiorari,' the United States Supreme Court reversed
and held- Missouri's law allowing women to exempt themselves from
jury duty on the basis of sex violates the sixth amendment right to a fair
jury trial because the resulting jury venires fail to reflect a fair cross
section of the community.9
According to 1970 census figures, women constitute 54% of the Jack-
I. State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1977) (en banc), rev'd sub noma. Duren v. Mis-
,ouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979).
2. 99 S. Ct. at 666-67.
3. Id. at 667. Petitioner also contended that the trial court erred by permitting joinder of the
tw'o charges against him in a single indictment and denying his motion for severance. 556 S.W.2d
at 11. Petitioner did not appeal the Missouri Supreme Court's adverse determination of this issue.
4. Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 22(b) provides: "No citizen shall be disqualified from jury service
because of sex, but the court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption therefrom before
being sworn as a juror."
5. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.031 (Vernon Supp. 1979) provides: "The following persons shall,
upon their timely application to the court, be excused from service as a juror, either grand or petit:
(2) any woman who requests exemption before being sworn as a juror."
6. Id. at §§ 494.020- .03 1.
7. 556 S.W.2d at 13-18. The Missouri Supreme Court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
because the case involved a constitutional question.
8 The Court granted certiorari because of a possible conflict with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975). 435 U.S. 1006 (1978) (No. 77-6067).
9. 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979).
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son County Community."° In 1976 Jackson County sent questionnaires
to 70,000 persons randomly selected from voter registration lists, in-
forming women of their right to decline service. From questionnaires
returned by those not claiming exemptions, the county constructed the
1976 jury wheel, which was about 29.1% female. Each week, the
county summoned jury venires randomly selected from the jury wheel,
and women were again notified of their option to decline service. Dur-
ing March 1976 when petitioner was tried, 29.5% of those summoned
were women and 15.5% of those appearing were women. For the peri-
ods June through October 1975 and January through March 1976,
26.7% of those summoned were female as were 14.5% of those who ap-
peared." Although not authorized by statute, Jackson County pre-
sumed that women who failed to appear had chosen to exercise their
option not to serve. 12
Prior to 1968, challenges to state jury selection systems that excluded
parts of the community on the basis of gender or race proceeded
mainly under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.' 3
Under equal protection analysis, courts required that jury systems that
excluded women do so on a rational basis.' 4 For example, in Hoyt v.
Florida5 the Court upheld a jury selection system that provided for
jury duty for both genders, but further required women to register their
desire to serve with the clerk of the trial court.' 6 The Court found that
10. 556 S.W.2d at 15-16.
11. Id. at 16.
12. 99 S. Ct. at 667 & n.14.
13. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (unsuccessful equal protection challenge by
a woman defendant to Florida's jury selection system, which excluded women); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953) (blacks unsuccessfully challenged state jury selection system based on prop-
erty tax lists as discriminating against blacks in violation of equal protection clause); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (state jury selection system that excluded blacks held to violate equal
protection guarantee); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (same); cf Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (mere absence of blacks from county jury commission does not
prove denial of equal protection to blacks in selection of commissioners). But see Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (due process challenge to New York's exclusion of women from jury
duty overruled). See generaly Note, Taylor v. Louisiana: Constitutional Implicationsfor Mis-
souri'r Jury Exemption Provisions, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 159, 162-67 (1975); 41 Mo. L. REV. 446,
448-50 (1976); 43 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 382, 383-84 (1975).
14. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961); c.
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (overturning conviction on equal protection grounds
of a person of Mexican descent who alleged that persons of similar descent were systematically
excluded from jury panel).
15. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
16. Id. at 58.
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the state legislature reasonably could have concluded that compulsory
jury duty would so severely impinge upon women's duties in the home
that they should be allowed to choose whether to serve.
1 7
After 1968, the focus of challenges to state jury trial practices shifted
to the sixth amendment guarantee to an impartial jury trial in criminal
prosecutions' 8 as a result of the Court's decision in Duncan v. Louisi-
anal9 that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
application of the sixth amendment to the states. 20
Thus, a criminal defendant, in Taylor v. Louisiana,2' challenged on
sixth amendment grounds a state jury selection system similar to that
upheld in Hoyt.22 Although more than 53% of persons eligible for jury
duty were female, women constituted less than 10% of the jury wheel
during the year of Taylor's trial.23 Relying on cases decided under the
sixth amendment,24 the equal protection clause, 25 and the Supreme
17. Id. at 62-63.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."
19. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
20. Id
21. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
22. Id. at 533-34. LA. CONST. art, VII, § 41 (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1976) provided:
The legislature shall provide for the election and drawing of competent and intelligent
jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no woman shall be
drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of the District
Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service.
Id. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 402 (West 1967) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1976) provided:
-A woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of the
court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury
service."
23. 419 U.S. at 524.
24. See Ballew v. Georgia, 436 U.S. 962 (1978) (cross section requirement of sixth and
fourteenth amendments requires a six-person jury for state criminal trials); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding federal requirement of unanimous verdict
in criminal trials is not mandatory in state criminal trials, but asserting, in dictum, that representa-
tion of cross section of community is mandatory); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)
(holding federal requirement of twelve-person jury is not required by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments in state criminal trials, but asserting, in dictum, that the sixth amendment requires "a
fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross section of the community"); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 83-87 (1942) (selection of women for jury duty from members of the League of
Women Voters who had attended a class on jury duty biased in favor of prosecution held to
violate basic element of sixth amendment that jury be representative of the community).
25, See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 & n.9 (1972) (white person has standing to challenge
state jury selection process on equal protection ground that blacks were excluded); Carter v. Jury
Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (blacks can seek injunctive relief against state that excludes
them from jury service); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 466-74 (1953) (state jury selection system
based on property tax lists sustained against challenge that it discriminated against blacks in viola-
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Court's supervisory powers over federal courts, 26 the Taylor Court
found that selection of petit juries from a fair cross section of the com-
munity was a fundamental element of the sixth amendment jury trial
guarantee.2" Distinguishing Hoyt on grounds that it involved only an
equal protection challenge, 28 the Court held that a systematic exclusion
of women that results in jury pools not reasonably representative of the
community violates the sixth amendment. 29 The Court tempered its
holding by noting that states remain free to provide narrowly drawn
exemptions from jury duty in cases of hardship and to those whose
occupation, in the interest of the welfare of the community, demands
uninterrupted attention,"0 because such exclusions are not likely to dis-
turb the representative nature of the jury pool.3' The Taylor Court
concluded by promulgating the Taylor fair cross section test: 'jury
wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community
and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof."32
In Duren v. Missouri33 the Court found that the Missouri Supreme
Court incorrectly distinguished the Taylor decision.3 4 The Court re-
stated the fair cross section test as requiring a threefold prima facie
showing: (1) the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the
tion of equal protection clause); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (exclusion of blacks by state
jury selection system violates equal protection clause).
26. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (reversing federal conviction in which
women were excluded from jury duty despite federal statutory design to make juries represent fair
cross section of community and despite state law allowing women jurors).
27. 419 U.S. at 528.
28. Id. at 533-35.
29. Id. at 537-38.
30. Id. at 534 (citing Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906)).
31. 419 U.S. at 534.
32. Id. at 538.
33. 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979).
34. Id. at 666. The Missouri Supreme Court distinguished Taylor on two bases. First, the
Louisiana system impaired the right of women to serve by automatically excluding by gender
unless they took affirmative steps to be included. Missouri law left the right to serve untouched,
and granted women the additional privilege of being excused if they so desired. 556 S.W.2d at 15.
Second, "the results of Louisiana's jury selection scheme contrast sharply with those of the selec-
tion process in [Duren]." Id. (emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court countered that fair cross section analysis depends not on the
right of excluded groups to serve on juries, but on the absence of a fair cross section of the com-
munity from the wheel, pool, or venire from which the jury is selected. 99 S. Ct. at 668; see Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). In addition, the Court noted that a deviation from 54% to
14.5% representation of the group allegedly excluded from jury venires is still symptomatic of a
systematic exclusion. 99 S. Ct. at 669.
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community; (2) the distinctive group is not represented on jury pools in
a fair and reasonable proportion to its number in the community; and
(3) the underrepresentation is caused by the systematic exclusion of the
group through the jury selection process.35
The Court found that petitioner met this burden. First, Taylor estab-
lished that women are sufficiently distinct from men so that their exclu-
sion from the courtroom, marked by the loss of "a flavor, a distinct
quality," satisfied the first prong of the test.36 Second, the Court noted
that while over half the community was female, women represented
only about 15% of the relevant venire. This "gross discrepancy" man-
dated the conclusion that women had not been fairly represented in
proportion to their number in the community.37 Third, a consistent
pattern of underrepresentation for a period of nearly a year demon-
strated that the system itself caused the exclusion.3' The jury selection
process notified women of their option not to serve at each step of the
process, and, if they did not appear when summoned, the state pre-
sumed that they had exercised their privilege.39 A continuing drop
from 54% women in the community to 26.7% of those summoned to
15% of those who appeared amounted to a systematic exclusion of wo-
men due to the jury selection process. 40
Satisfied with petitioner's prima facie showing, the Court looked to
the state to prove that the improper jury venire was attributable to an
aspect of the jury selection process that "manifestly and primarily ad-
vanced" a "significant state interest."'4 ' The state first argued that the
discrepancy could be attributed to exemptions other than the one pro-
vided for women, such as those for school teachers, persons over sixty-
35. 99 S. Ct. at 668.
36. Id. See 419 U.S. at 531-32.
37. 99 S. Ct. at 669. The Missouri Supreme Court felt constrained to note several "eviden-
tiary gaps" in petitioner's statistics: (1) nothing demonstrated static gender distribution from 1970-
76; (2) census figures did not include 18- to 21-year-olds; (3) proof that percentages of each gender
on voter registration lists reflected their actual proportion in the community was absent; and (4)
-[T]hose who claimed exemption could do so for a wide array of reasons other than the fact of
their sex. For example, school teachers and government workers, whose jobs typically attract
substantial numbers of women may decline to serve." 556 S.W.2d at 15-16.
The Supreme Court, characterizing the above analysis as "speculation," 99 S. Ct. at 669 & n.22,
found petitioner's statistics sufficient to facilitate fair cross section analysis. Id. at 669 & nn.22-24.
38, 99 S. Ct. at 669.
39. Id See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
40. 99 S. Ct. at 669.
41. Id.
Number 1]
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five, and government workers. 42 Assuming arguendo that those exemp-
tions would justify failure to achieve a fair cross section, the Court
found that the state had not proved that the exemptions caused the
disproportion. Mere speculation without actual proof of causation
could not satisfy the state's burden of proof. 3 Second, the state in oral
argument44 advanced an interest in safeguarding the woman's responsi-
bility to her home and family life, but, just as in Taylor,45 the Court
deemed the justification insufficient because more narrowly drawn ex-
ceptions could protect this interest.46
Justice Rehnquist in dissent argued that the Court's fair cross section
test was no more than a disguise for equal protection analysis aimed
not at petitioner's sixth amendment rights, but at women's rights to
serve on juries.47 A further problem in applying the fair cross section
42. Id. at 670; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494.031 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
43. 99 S. Ct. at 670.
44. Record at 28 (Nov. 2, 1978).
45. Taylor overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), which held that the maintenance
and protection of the family were rational reasons under the equal protection clause for exempting
women from jury duty. See note 15 supra. The Missouri Supreme Court previously had relied on
the reasoning in Hoyt. See State v. Wright, 476 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1972); State v. Davis, 462
S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1971); State v. Parker, 462 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1971). But see State v. Smith, 467
S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1971).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 670.
Many states excuse women from jury duty when family responsibility or care of a child under a
certain age interferes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) ("West Supp. 1979) (mothers with
children younger than 15 may request exemption); GA. CODE ANN. § 59-112(b) (Supp. 1978)
(housewife with child aged 14 or younger may be excused); MAss. ANN. LAWS, Ch. 234, § I
(Michie/Law Co-op 1974) (exemption given to parents or person having custody of a child under
15 years of age); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:69-2(g) (West 1952) (exemption given to any person with
actual care and custody of minor child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28A (West Supp. 1978)
(exemption to all persons with custody of minor children if such person's absence would result in
hardship); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-9-11 (1920) (amended 1976); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2135
(2) (West Supp. 1978-1979) (exemption given all females who have legal custody of a child aged
under 10 years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-10(14) (1953) (exemption for a citizen who has active
care of a minor child); VA. CODE § 8.01-341.1(B) (1977) (exemption given any person who has
legal custody of, and is necessarily and personally responsible for, a child sixteen years of age or
younger who requires continuous care during normal court hours).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 672 & n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). After noting similarities between equal
protection and fair cross section analysis, Justice Rehnquist tried to show from a historical point
of view how the equal protection doctrine had infected fair cross section analysis. Id. at 672 n.*
The equal protection proposition that blacks are no less qualified to serve on juries than whites,
derived from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879), provided the foundation for the
majority's holding that women are no less qualified than men to serve on juries. 99 S. Ct. at 672
n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). From this, Justice Rehnquist queried, if "men and women are
essentially fungible for purposes ofjury duty,. . .how [does] underrepresentation of either sex on
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/27
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test, in Justice Rehnquist's view, lies in determining what representa-
tion in jury wheels of the alleged excluded group is "fair and reason-
able" in proportion to the number of those persons in the community.48
From Tallor, and now Duren, it is clear that less than 15% of a major-
ity grouping will constitute a prima facie violation. The result, how-
ever, remains unclear when the excluded group is less than a majority
of the community or when there is a smaller aberration from propor-
tional representation on jury wheels.49  Justice Rehnquist thus pre-
dicted that state legislatures, because of this uncertainty and a desire to
insulate the validity of future criminal convictions, would abolish all
exemptions from jury duty."
the jury or the venire [infringe] a defendant's right to have his fate decided by an impartial tribu-
na?" Id.
At oral argument, defendant's counsel asserted that there was an "indefinable something" that
does make a difference from a defendant's point of view. Id. Justice Rehnquist, however, ques-
tioned how that analysis meshed with the Court's conclusion that petit juries need not mirror the
community even though jury wheels, pools, and venires must be fairly representative of the com-
munity. Id See note 15 supra and accompanying text. He opined that if impartiality, the re-
quirement of the sixth amendment at issue, is not lost when women are "underrepresented on the
petit jury, it is certainly not lost when [they are] underrepresented on the jury venire." 99 S. Ct. at
673 n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). He concluded, therefore, that the major-
ity could not have been concerned with defendant's sixth amendment rights. Id.
Justice Rehnquist's analysis misconstrued the issue. The reason the Court conceded that perfect
representation of the community on petit junes was not mandated by the sixth amendment was a
recognition of the practical impossibility of such representation. There are more than 12 "distinct
groups" in the community. Furthermore, the ability of counsel to strike jurors during voir dire
adds a further variable to petit jury' selection not applicable to selection of jury wheels, pools, and
venires. Because of the greater number of people in jury wheels, pools, and venires, one could
expect them to more closely mirror the community. A gross discrepancy in a group's representa-
ton on wheels, pools, and venires reduces defendant's opportunity to select a petit jury reflecting a
fair cross section of the community. This loss of opportunity caused by a state's jury selection
Nystem impinges upon a defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. See 99 S. Ct. at
666; notes 10-18 supra and accompanying text.
48. 99 S. Ct. at 674 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Eventually the Court either will insist that women be treated identically to men for
purposes of jury selection ... , or in some later sequel to this line of cases will discover
some peculiar magic in the number 15 that will enable it to distinguish between such a
percentage and higher percentages less than 50.
Id. at 673-74.
50. Id. at 674.
Justice Rehnquist concluded his opinion by noting that the real losers in the Court's Duren
decision were the people of Missouri "seeking the incarceration of those convicted of serious
crimes alter a fair trial." Id. at 674. His attempt to blame the court for this result, however, is not
justifiable. A recent editorial appearing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 31, 1979, § C, at 2,
col. 4 (reprinted from The Kansas City Star). indicated that the blame should lie with the Missouri
Legislature. The editorial noted that three states with statutes similar to Missouri's-Alabama,
Rhode Island, and New York-saw the writing on the wall after the Taylor decision and amended
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Justice Rehnquist's fears are unfounded. Indeed, doctors and nurses,
for example, are probably a "distinct" group in the community, and a
prima facie fair cross section violation caused by their exemption prob-
ably would not be difficult to prove. Justice Rehnquist's analysis also
ignores the state's opportunity to justify aberrations from a fair cross
section by showing a significant state interest served by the exemption
in question.5'
As the Court's dictum implies, 52 such a showing in the case of most
"reasonable exemptions" should not be difficult. 53 Although most oc-
cupational and age exemptions could result in prima facie fair cross
section violations,54 the Court probably will find these exemptions to
"manifestly and primarily" advance significant state interests.
TORTS-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY-STATE COURT JUDGE HAS ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY IN § 1983 ACTION. Slump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978). Respondent's mother filed a petition to have respondent (then a
fifteen-year-old girl) sterilized, alleging that respondent was "somewhat
retarded" and had begun to associate with, and on several occasions
had stayed out overnight with, "older youth or young men."' Peti-
their statutes to avoid losing their convictions. Id. Missouri and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 22.108 (1975), neglected to change the women's exemption provisions in their statutes. Thus,
only the Missouri Legislature should be blamed for putting "the destiny of Missouri in the hands
of the nation's highest court instead of the elected officials." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 31,
1979, § C, at 2, col. 4 (reprinted from the Kansas City Star).
51. See notes 25-31 supra and accompanying text.
52. 99 S. Ct. at 671.
53. Justice Rehnquist's analysis reveals his belief that at least one common exemption does
serve significant state interests:
Doctors and nurses, though virtually irreplacable in smaller communities, may ulti-
mately be held by the Court to bring their own "flavor" or "indescribable something" to
a jury venire. [See note 32 supra]. If so, they could then be exempted from jury service
only on a case-by-case basis, and would join others with skills much less in demand
whiling away their time in jury rooms of countless courthouses.
Id. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. For example, it would seem likely that most doctors and people over sixty-five exercise
their rights not to serve. Assuming that they do, their representation on jury venires. pools, and
wheels is probably grossly disproportionate to their size in the community.
1. Petition to Have Tubal Ligation Performed on Minor and Indemnity Agreement (Ind.,
DeKalb Cir. Ct., filed July 9, 1971), reprinted in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 n.l (1978).
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